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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j) and § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
The Amended Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
entered November 27, 2007. Plaintiffs notice of appeal was timely filed December 21, 
2007. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing all causes of action when 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment did not even address Plaintiffs claims for 
malpractice, promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance, or reckless misconduct. See pp. 
1-2 of Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Determinative law: Rules 54 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review. Since resolution of this issue involves a conclusion of law, it 
is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's ruling. Fair v. Brinkerhoff 829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
II. Whether the lower court erred when it dismissed the Second Amended 
Complaint with prejudice after finding "Plaintiff sued under the wrong legal contract." See 
June 12, 2007 hearing transcript at 4-5. 
Determinative law: Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Bounds v. Smith. 
430 U.S. 817, 821-28(1977). 
Standard of review: "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
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of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'1 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Ut Ct. App. 1994). Whether 
summary judgment was appropriate is a question of law. Id. at 1312. This Court gives no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary 
judgment, but reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America. Inc.. 814 
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we liberally 
construe all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the facts in favor of the non-
moving party." Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d at 1312. 
III. Whether the lower court erred in finding Defendants had no contractual 
obligation to provide assistance on appeal for Plaintiff when Defendants' contract bid 
proposals promised to provide appeal packets to inmates. See hearing transcript at 8,15-16. 
Determinative law: Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review: See standard for summary judgment review set forth in Issue II. 
IV. Whether the lower court erred in finding Plaintiff had not been damaged by the 
actions or inactions of Defendants. See hearing transcript at 20-31. 
Determinative law: Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review. See standard for summary judgment review set forth in Issue 
II. 
V. Whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment without ruling 
on Plaintiffs Motions to Compel Discovery and his Rule 56(f) Affidavit. See hearing 
transcript at 14, 33-36, and 41-42. 
Determinative law: Rules 37 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review: See standard for summary judgment review set forth in issue II. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Darren C. Bluemel (hereinafter "Bluemel") filed suit alleging contract 
attorneys Wayne A. Freestone and David J. Angerhofer (hereinafter "Defendants"), failed 
to provide contractually obligated or legally sufficient legal services to a third-party 
beneficiary for challenging the legality of incarceration. Bluemel is in prison for criminal 
homicide, a first degree felony, which occurred on or about March 23, 1999. He was 
sentenced on August 30, 1999, to serve five years to life in prison. 
Bluemel sought assistance from Defendants to file a petition for post-conviction relief. 
Bluemel completed a handwritten draft of the petition simply by filling in the blanks for 
Defendants. Without doing any research on the matter or editing the handwritten petition to 
state a cognizable claim, Defendants simply filed the petition in the Third District Court. The 
petition was dismissed. Index at 738-743. 
When Defendants filed the petition, they failed to include a number of crucial medical 
documents and reports which Bluemel had submitted to them for review by the court. Index 
at 748-863. Bluemel has been unable to submit the factual basis for his post-conviction 
claim to any court because the original petition, which lacked substantive evidence because 
of Defendants'1 negligence or oversight, was summarily dismissed. 
Defendants provided misleading information to Bluemel regarding his appeal rights, 
the statute of limitations, and the services they would be performing for him. Plaintiffs 
Affidavit, index at 637-646. 
In this case, Bluemel's original Complaint, First Amended Complaint and Second 
Amended Complaint were all done pro se. 
On or about April 9, 2007, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, or 
in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The parties fully briefed the 
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summary judgment issues. Index at 487-746. 
On June 12, 2007, the lower court heard oral argument on Defendants' summary 
judgment motion and Bluemel's Motion to Compel Discovery. After taking the matters 
under advisement, the court issued its ruling via a "Minutes Law and Motion," dated June 
20, 2007, in which it granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. Index at 744-46. 
Defendants prepared detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, to which 
Bluemel objected. Index at 864-895. The lower court, via an undated Minute Entry, 
instructed Defendants to prepare a revised and more brief Amended Order. Index at 898-
900. On or about November 13, 2007, Bluemel objected to the proposed Amended Order. 
Index at 901 -02. The lower court signed the Amended Order on November 27,2007. Index 
at 906-08. Bluemel filed his Notice of Appeal on December 21, 2007. Index at 909-10. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of Contract #986723, the Defendants were 
contractually obligated to assist Bluemel with the preparation and filing of legally effective 
pleadings for challenging the legality of his incarceration, and to perfect and prosecute a first 
appeal of right in the event the district court denied any relief. Second Amended Complaint, 
index at 377. 
1. In 2000 and 2001, Defendants were contract attorneys for the Utah State Prison 
inmates housed at Central Utah Correctional Facility (hereinafter "CUCF") in Gunnison, 
Utah and at the Garfield County Jail. Defendants maintain separate contracts govern the 
performance of legal services at each of those two facilities, 986723 for CUCF and 986774 
for Garfield County Jail. See Affidavit of Defendant Angerhofer, Index at 489-95. 
2. In contract 986723, the contract that legal services for Bluemel were initiated 
4 
under, Defendants incorporated by reference their specific intent of where the legal services 
would be performed. This provision expands the general purpose clause by stating 
continuing services will be performed without interruption in the event of an inmate's transfer 
to a county jail. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at f^ 3, Index at 637. 
3. The only contract identified in Bluemel's Second Amended Complaint is the 
one for CUCF, 986723. 
4. Defendants initially met with Bluemel on or about January 24, 2000, while 
Bluemel was housed at CUCF in Gunnison. During the initial meeting on January 24, 
Defendant Angerhofer opened a case file on the issue of Bluemel's desire to challenge the 
legality of his conviction. During that meeting, Angerhofer completed the inmate intake 
form, provided Bluemel with a Rule 65B extraordinary relief packet, and informed Bluemel 
his matter was governed by a four-year statute of limitations. See copy of Inmate Intake 
Form, which was attached as Appendix B to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. Index 
at 399-400. 
5. In the "Memorandum" dated January 31, 2000, which followed up on the 
intake meeting of January 24th, Defendants informed Bluemel they were enclosing the 
petition for writ of extraordinary relief packet. Defendants requested Bluemel to complete 
the information and return it to their office "to assess the merits of your case. If we 
determine that your claim is meritorious, we will prepare the pleadings from the information 
you have filed. If we determine that your claim is questionable as to merit, we will 
contact you for further instructions." Index at 613 (emphasis added). At no time did 
Defendants inform Bluemel his claim was of questionable merit or lacked merit. Based upon 
the Memorandum agreement, Bluemel understood Defendants were preparing the pleadings 
from the information he provided them. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at f 44, Index at 652-53. 
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6. Defendants breached the agreement by not preparing and filing the appropriate 
petition pursuant to Defendants5 January 31, 2000 "Memorandum" regarding "requested 
legal services." Index at 613. 
7. Bluemel relied upon the information provided to him by Defendant Angerhofer 
and was basing his strategy/actions under the four-year limitations. See Plaintiffs Affidavit 
at T|45 Index at 637. 
8. Defendants provided Bluemel with the wrong packet, a Rule 65B packet for 
extraordinary relief instead of a Rule 65C packet for post-conviction relief. See Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at fflf 5, 6, Index at 637. 
9. Bluemel alleged Defendants breached Department of Corrections Contract 
#986723, which has the general purpose of providing "legal services at Central Utah 
Correctional Facility (CUCF), Gunnison, Utah" (emphasis in original). See Plaintiffs 
Second Amended Complaint, Index at 376-395. 
10. Bluemel believed this was the appropriate contract because when he submitted 
a GRAMA request, this contract was the one supplied to him. Bluemel continued to deal 
with both Defendants despite his transfer to different facilities. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at 
Tf 7, Index at 637-48. 
11. Defendants have stated Contract #986723 does not provide for legal services 
for inmates in any facility other than CUCF and does not provide for continuing legal 
services for inmates who were once housed at CUCF but were subsequently transferred to 
another facility or who have paroled, terminated or expirated their sentences. See 
Angerhofer Affidavit, index at 490. Bluemel believes the contract provisions are much 
broader than the language cited by Defendants. Defendants held an exclusive agreement (at 
that time) to provide legal services to Utah Department of Corrections' inmates regardless 
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of housing assignment. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at % 8, Index at 638. 
12. Defendants' contract with the Utah Department of Corrections, Contract No. 
986723, includes "Attachment C: Scope of Work." Pursuant to the contract, Attachment C 
is "Additional Contract - Specific Terms." Under the "Scope of Services, Legal Assistance," 
it states: 
2. Assisting inmates shall consist of the following, the CONTRACTOR 
shall: ... 
b. keep sufficiently detailed and accurate records to thoroughly 
document contractor's performance under the contract; 
c. screen inmate claims for meritorious legal content: a claim is 
meritorious if it can be supported by a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; 
d. conduct the amount of legal research reasonably necessary to 
support inmate claims having legal merit; 
j . provide legal services by means of telephone and/or mail to 
inmates housed outside the state of Utah whose causes of action 
arose while housed within the state of Utah; 
See Contract, Index at 402-21; Plaintiffs Affidavit at If 9, Index at 638, and attached in 
Addendum to Brief at A-8. 
13. Defendants breached this contract by not keeping accurate records, not 
screening the case, not conducting any research on it, and not preparing any legally sufficient 
petition. See Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tj 10, Index at 638-39. 
14. Contract 986723 also states "DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED INTO THIS 
CONTRACT BY REFERENCE BUT NOT ATTACHED" include "(b) Utah State 
Procurement Code, Procurement Rules, and contractor's response to Bid # RM 8252, dated 
May 5, 1998." Index at 592. 
15. Under the experience section of Defendants' proposal for the services contract, 
they state: 
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Both Mr. Angerhofer and Mr. Freestone have been providing legal services for 
the inmates at the Utah State Prison at Draper, Gunnison, Iron County and the 
County jails for almost eight years. During that period of time they have met 
with more than 10,000 inmates and filed more than 444 Civil Rights 
Complaints and 162 Petitioners for Writs of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Angerhofer 
and Mr. Freestone have also drafted approximately 528 Civil Rights 
Complaints and 438 Petitioners for Writs of Habeas Corpus that have been 
sent to inmates who wished to file them themselves or have not returned the 
finalized documents for filing. All of these Complaints and Petitions, of 
course, included all research and pleadings necessary to give the inmates 
access to the Courts. 
Appendix C at p. 6, Index at 605-06. 
The fact that Offerors are already servicing the North Point, South Point, Iron 
County, and County Jail facilities would be advantageous to the Central Utah 
Correctional Facility inmates. It is certain that many of the inmates that are 
now in the South Point, North Point, Iron County and County Jail facilities will 
be transferred back and forth between the Central Utah Correctional Facility 
and the other facilities. Since Offerors have consulted with more than 10,000 
inmates in the last eight years, most of which have required follow up services, 
it is likely many of the inmates which will be transferred to the Central 
Utah Correctional Facility will still need follow up on these matters. 
If Offerors were servicing the Central Utah Correctional Facility in addition 
to the South Point, North Point, Iron County, and County Jail facilities, then 
a transfer to the Central Utah Correctional Facility would not interfere 
with any legal services that the inmates have requested. 
Id at 7-8 (emphasis added); Index at 610-11, Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tf 11, Index at 639-40 
and attached as Addendum to Brief. 
16. Bluemel transferred from CUCF to Garfield County Jail sometime between 
January 24, 2000, and July 3, 2000. Angerhofer Affidavit, index at 490. 
17. Defendants maintained they performed legal services at the Garfield County 
Jail pursuant to Department of Corrections Contract #986774. Bluemel believes the services 
Defendants provided to him were under more than one contract. Under contract 986774, the 
service mainly consisted of dispensing court forms and the subsequent filing with the court. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 112, Index at 640. 
18. On or about July 3, 2000, Defendant Freestone met with Bluemel at the 
8 
Garfield County Jail in Panguich, Utah. During the July 3rd meeting, Defendant Freestone 
learned Bluemel had a previous meeting with Defendant Angerhofer. Freestone stated he 
would forward Bluemel's information onto Angerhofer who was handling Bluemel's case. 
See Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tf 13, Index at 640-41. 
19. Bluemel informed Defendants he wished to challenge his conviction of June 
1999 for various reasons, including that he was under the influence of medication at the time 
he entered his plea for the crime of first degree murder. Bluemel, who suffers from an 
organic brain injury and diminished mental capacity for which he was awarded Social 
Security disability, experienced symptoms such as dizzy spells and memory loss. He became 
easily confused, had great difficulty reading, and frequently became disoriented. These are 
some of the poorly articulated claims he attempted to raise in the state habeas petition. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at f^ 14, index at 641. The medical records supporting these claims are 
the ones Bluemel submitted to Defendants but they failed to attach them to his original 
petition. See second Affidavit of David W. Brown, index at 750. 
20. On or about August 10 to 15,2000, Defendant Angerhofer informed Bluemel 
of a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a Petition for post-conviction relief (65C). 
Up until that date, Bluemel believed he was working under a four-year statute of limitations 
based upon his meeting with Angerhofer on January 24, 2000. Defendant Freestone never 
mentioned any statute of limitations during the July 3 and August 1, 2000, meetings with 
Bluemel. The only time Bluemel addressed the issue of the sentencing hearing date with 
Defendant Angerhofer was in January 2000. Defendant Freestone did not comment on the 
date of Bluemel's sentencing at the July 3,2000, meeting. Plaintiffs Affidavit at f 15, Index 
at 641-42. 
21. Defendants sent Bluemel a post-conviction relief packet, but he never knew 
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the packet was being sent until it arrived at the jail. Coincidentally, Bluemel received the 
packet the same day he met with Defendant Freestone, August 1,2000. Bluemel specifically 
remembers this date because he heard the contract attorneys were at the jail that day, and then 
he requested to meet with them even though he was not scheduled to do so. Bluemel sought 
help with completing the forms in the packet. Defendant Freestone told Bluemel simply to 
follow the instructions. Plaintiffs Affidavit at f^ 16, Index at 642. 
22. During the mid-August 2000 meeting, Defendant Angerhofer instructed 
Bluemel to return the packet as quickly as possible and to include a special note on its front 
to bring the statute of limitations issue to the attention of Defendants' staff. See Angerhofer 
Affidavit, Index at 492. 
23. The time was not "nearly up" to file the Petition, as argued by Defendants. 
They again mis-calculated the deadline for filing said Petition. Plaintiffs Affidavit at If 16, 
Index at 642. 
24. Bluemel was sentenced on the underlying criminal charge on August 30, 1999. 
The last day Bluemel could have filed a timely notice of appeal was 30 days later, September 
29, 1999, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). His conviction became final 
under the governing state and federal post-conviction relief statutes on September 29,1999, 
and the one-year limitations period began running on that date. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-107(2). The deadline for filing his Petition was not until September 28,2000. Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at Tf 17, and Timeline attached to Affidavit as Exhibit A, Index at 657-58. 
25. There was never a discussion on statute of limitations where "Defendant told 
Bluemel that the packet may be effectively filed as is due to the severe time constraints, i.e. 
that hand written petitions were acceptable to the Court." Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tf 18, Index 
at 643. 
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26. Bluemel never agreed to having Defendants submit his hand-written, unedited 
Petition to the court. Defendants had almost 45 days to prepare a proper and thorough 
pleading from the information Bluemel provided to them. Defendants failed to do anything 
with the draft other than to file it as-is. Plaintiffs Affidavit at j^ 18, Index at 643. 
27. Paragraph 11 of Bluemel's Petition stated: "Because of my mental state of 
mind and the medication I was on. To be blunt, I could not tell the difference between shit 
and shineolu! That is how screwed up I was!" Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 3, 
Index at 771; Plaintiffs Affidavit at j^ 19, Index at 643. There is no way Bluemel would 
have written such language to be included in the actual petition being filed in court. He 
supplied such language to help Defendants understand his position at that time and then 
incorporate it into a legally sufficient pleading. Plaintiffs Affidavit at f 20, Index at 643. 
28. Defendant mailed the post conviction packet to Bluemel on July 21,2000, and 
received the packet back from the Garfield County Jail on or about August 17, 2000, 
approximately 40 days before expiration of the statute of limitations. Bluemel included a 
note requested by Defendants to "please process these form (sic) as soon as possible!" 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at ^ 21, Index at 643-44. 
29. Defendants had requested Bluemel alert them about the upcoming deadline. 
Bluemel never told either Defendant when the statute of limitations would expire — they 
were the ones who were informing him. Defendants were aware of the conviction date, but 
miscalculated the date when the petition had to be filed. Defendants' office file check list 
form reflects that Defendants received the packet in their office on August 17, 2000. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at f 21, Index at 644. 
30. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l)(c), the last day to have filed a 
post-conviction relief Petition in Bluemel's case was September 28, 2000. That date was at 
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least 45 days from the mid-August, 2000 meeting between Bluemel and Defendant 
Angerhofer, which was sufficient time for Defendants to research and draft a proper petition. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at ^ 21, Index at 644. 
31. Bluemel does not claim any statute of limitations was missed regarding his 
post-conviction relief Petition. See hearing transcript, index beginning at 923, at 26-28. 
Bluemel claims Defendants twice mis-calculated the deadline for filing the Petition, thereby 
rushing to file a seriously deficient document when no deadline was imminent. Bluemel 
claims the deadline for filing his notice of appeal after dismissal of his post-conviction relief 
Petition was missed. Contract 986723 and its incorporated provisions states that Defendants 
felt it was important to assist inmates with an appeal packet in the event the habeas court 
denied relief. Defendants failed to timely provide Bluemel with either a packet or 
instructions/information about the appeal process. Defendants never informed Bluemel of 
the fatal consequences of not appealing the original dismissal. Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tj 23, 
index at 645-46. 
32. When Bluemel requested a copy of the contractual obligations, the UDC 
provided only one out of several contracts, which he believed represented the true and correct 
agreement for inmate legal services regardless of housing assignment. The only instruction 
Defendants gave to Bluemel was what was stated in their memorandum promise and what 
was to be included with the Petition, as stated in the court forms packet which Defendants 
have re-packaged. Plaintiffs Affidavit at f^ 25, Index at 646-47. 
33. At no time did either Defendant advise Bluemel to include transcripts, the 
statement in advance of plea, commitment order, etc., with the Petition for it to be forwarded 
to the court. Defendants told Bluemel to submit the materials to their office so they would 
have plenty of time to complete the pleadings. Because Bluemel did not intend his hand-
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written draft to be submitted to the court, he only asserted conclusory allegations. The vast 
amount of supporting materials that were provided to the contract attorneys was designed to 
assist Defendants in drafting legally sufficient pleadings. Bluemel's case involved a 
complicated set of issues which needed substantial revision and research by Defendants. 
Instead, Defendants merely forwarded a portion of the materials to the court with an apparent 
hope the judge would appoint counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-109(1) and (2). When 
no counsel was appointed, Bluemel's Petition was in trouble and was summarily dismissed. 
Plaintiffs Affidavit at 126, Index at 647-48. 
34. For his post conviction relief Petition, Bluemel provided a transcript, a 
statement of defendant, an Information, and letters from his mother, his sister and two friends 
stating his mental condition. Those documents were attached to the post conviction relief 
packet filed by Defendants. In addition to that information, Bluemel also included his mental 
health records, records used to secure benefits from the Social Security Administration and 
photographs of the draconian pretrial conditions in which Bluemel was housed. Neither the 
mental health or the SSA records were provided with Defendants' disclosures in response to 
Bluemel's formal requests for discovery. However, Defendants have acknowledged 
receiving the photographs and evidence of mental health records from Bluemel. It appears 
the most important records and documents provided by Bluemel to Defendants were not 
included in the Petition that was filed by Defendants. Plaintiffs Affidavit at f 27, Index at 
648; See second Affidavit of David W. Brown, Index at 748-50. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment focused on the fact Bluemel, acting pro 
se, brought his action under the wrong contract. Defendants' summary judgment pleadings 
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do not even address BluemePs separate claims for malpractice, promissory estoppel, 
reasonable reliance, or reckless misconduct. Under Rules 54 and 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it was inappropriate to dismiss the entire Complaint with prejudice. The 
trial court had no authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination at 
the summary judgment stage. 
Bluemel believes the Memorandum agreement dated January 30, 2000 established a 
separate contract between the parties - one that was independent of the Department of 
Corrections' contracts. Defendants breached the January 30th agreement by not researching, 
drafting or filing a legally cognizable petition for Bluemel. 
The lower court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint "with prejudice" despite 
finding "Bluemel sued under the wrong legal contract." If Bluemel's claims were brought 
under the wrong contract, the appropriate remedy was not a dismissal with prejudice. At best, 
the Complaint could have been dismissed without prejudice, and then only on the contract 
claim. 
The lower court's decision that Defendants had no contractual obligation to provide 
assistance on appeal for Bluemel was erroneous. The Defendants' contract bid proposals had 
promised to provide appeal packets to inmates such as Bluemel. At the time Defendants 
were bidding on the contracts in question, they stated inmates may need some assistance on 
appeal. Their promise to provide such appeal packets should be binding upon Defendants 
since they used such an offer as a marketing tool to secure the bid. 
The lower court's finding that Bluemel had not suffered any damages as a result of 
Defendants' actions was not supported by the record. There are genuine issues of material 
fact regarding the damages suffered by Bluemel as a result of Defendants' actions or 
inactions. The damages include the fact Bluemel has been precluded from providing a 
14 
factual basis or documentary evidence supporting any writ of habeas corpus filed in different 
courts. The petition Defendants filed on behalf of Bluemel did not include crucial documents 
which Bluemel and his family had provided to the Defendants. Other damages include but 
are not limited to Defendants' miscalculation regarding the statute of limitations, filing his 
pro se petition without any editing or supporting case law, giving Bluemel wrong information 
about where to file his other petition, and failure to provide him with any appeal packet. 
The lower court erred by granting the Motion for Summary Judgment without 
resolving the pending Motions to Compel Discovery. Bluemel's counsel filed a Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit explaining that certain items of discovery were crucial and needed to be produced 
prior to completion of the summary judgment pleadings. 
One of the key issues regarding the Motions to Compel is that Defendants never 
produced the correct contract so Bluemel would be able to plead or amend his Complaint 
accordingly. Even though Defendants argued at the Motions' hearing they had supplied all 
documents in their possession, they clearly never produced the main and crucial contract until 
they filed for summary judgment. The outstanding issues related to the Motions to Compel 
Discovery are additional reasons to deny relief at the summary judgment stage and to remand 
for a trial of this matter. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment Is Inappropriate On Bluemel's Causes Of Action For 
Malpractice (Negligence), Promissory Estoppel, Reasonable Reliance, Reckless 
Misconduct. 
Under the standard for summary judgment, Defendants1 Motion should have been 
denied. There are multiple, genuine issues of material fact, and Defendants were not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.56(c). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a standard for whether a "genuine 
issue" exists is "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 423, 428 (1986). The test 
for materiality is whether there are "disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the 
suit under the governing law" which would properly preclude summary judgment. Id 
The Tenth Circuit has held that the court must examine "all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party." Manders v. Oklahoma Ex. Rel. Dep't of Mental 
Health, 875 F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir. 1989). When this Court considers the facts and 
inferences "in the light most favorable to the opposing party, " Creekview Apartments v. 
State Farm Ins., 771 P.2d 693,695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the pleadings, affidavits, contracts 
and exhibits show genuine issues of material fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment 
for Defendants. 
The burden is on the moving party to show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that he is entitled to judgment, and "all substantial doubts are to be resolved against him, 
and his supporting affidavits and depositions are to be carefully scrutinized." Zampos v. 
United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171, 174 (10th Cir. 1953). 
The court ignored this standard when it dismissed Bluemel's entire Complaint, which 
included not only the contract claims but all other causes of action. 
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Throughout Defendants5 summary judgment pleadings, in their motion, supporting 
memorandum and affidavits, and at oral argument on the motion, they never addressed any 
causes of action except for the contract claims. Bluemel addressed this obvious discrepancy 
in his opposition memorandum, but Defendants failed to respond to it in their Reply 
Memorandum, Affidavits or at oral argument. 
Defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," is somewhat vague and ambiguous. 
The Motion does not state or specify the issue(s) upon which they are seeking 
partial summary judgment. They purportedly seek summary judgment only on 
Bluemefs claims for breach of contract or third party beneficiary. The Motion 
does not mention Bluemefs causes of action for malpractice (negligence), 
promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance or reckless misconduct. 
Since Defendants have failed to mention these causes of action in their 
affidavits, motion or memorandum, Bluemel believes Defendants have not 
filed for summary judgment on these other claims. (If Defendants are 
somehow seeking summary judgment on these issues, Bluemel requests the 
opportunity to file the proper reply memorandum.) 
See Plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum at 1-2, index at 533-34. 
There is no question that in the caption of Defendants' Motion, they requested either 
full or partial summary judgment. However, it is uncontroverted Defendants never argued 
any facts, basis or case law that would support a dismissal on the remaining causes of action. 
The Second Amended Complaint raised the following claims which were not included in 
Defendants' summary judgment pleadings: Count VI (Malpractice), Count V (Reckless 
Misconduct), and Count III (Promissory Estoppel and Reasonable Reliance). Although the 
Complaint was drafted pro se, it asserts valid claims which he had no opportunity to argue 
because they were never challenged or even addressed by Defendants at any point in their 
summary judgment pleadings or presentation. 
"It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and unsupported by 
the record." Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.. 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984). 
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The trial court is not privileged to determine matters outside the issues of the 
case, and if he does, his findings will have no force or effect. In law or in 
equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issue framed by the pleadings, 
and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not presented 
for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity. A 
court may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by the 
pleadings nor within the theory on which the case was tried, whether that 
theory was expressly stated or implied by the proof adduced. 
Id. at 736 (citations omitted). 
Combe is directly in point. The dismissal of all causes of action, especially those not 
addressed in Defendants' Motion, is inappropriate. The decision to dismiss BluemePs final 
three causes of action is "a nullity" because they were outside the issues to be determined in 
the summary judgment pleadings. 
Although Rule 54(c)( 1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits relief on grounds 
not pleaded, "that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues 
neither raised nor tried." Fair v. Brinkerhoff 829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
quoting Combe, 680 P.2d at 735. 
Under Rule 54(b) and the case law construing said rule, if the lower court had simply 
dismissed the contract claims, this matter would not even have resulted in a final judgment 
subject to certification for appeal. In Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1, 2 
(Utah 1991), the court held that the lower court ruling did not dispose of a "separate claim" 
where four other causes of action remain, each arising from the same factual circumstances, 
and the trial court improperly certified the order as a final judgment. See, Town of Manila 
v. Broadbent Land Co.. 818 P.2d 2, 4 (Utah 1991). 
Since BluemeFs claims involve negligence by Defendants, summary judgment is even 
more improper. "Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in negligence 
cases." Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). "Whether a defendant has 
beached the required standard of care is generally a question for the jury." Id. at 727, citing 
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Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). Defendants' miscalculating the statute of 
limitations on two occasions, one when visiting at the CUCF and the other at the Garfield 
County Jail, are classic instances of malpractice. Whether, or how, Bluemel has been 
damaged by these mistaken limitations calculations is an issue which should be resolved by 
the jury. 
Based upon the pleadings before the lower court and the record on appeal, it is 
completely inappropriate to dismiss BluemePs entire case when he did not even have an 
opportunity at the summary judgment stage to defend his remaining causes of action. 
II. Defendants Violated Their Own "Memorandum" Agreement With 
Bluemel By Not Preparing Any Viable Pleadings. 
The facts of this case show Defendants entered into a binding agreement with Bluemel 
by their own Memorandum agreement on January 31, 2000. Defendants clearly breached 
such contract. 
Whether Defendants were operating under contract 986723 for CUCF or 986774 for 
the Garfield County Jail, Defendants still are in breach of their separate contractual 
agreement with Bluemel. In addition to the contractual rights and duties spelled out in 
contracts 986723 and 986774, Defendants entered into a separate "Memorandum" agreement 
regarding requested legal services on January 31, 2000. See Index at 613. This agreement 
stated Defendants would submit the petition for extraordinary relief packet to Bluemel. Once 
they received the information from Bluemel, they would "assess the merits of your case. If 
we determine your claim is meritorious, we will prepare the pleadings from the information 
you have filed. If we determine that your claim is questionable as to merit, we will contact 
you for further instructions." Index at 613. 
Since Defendants never informed Bluemel, either in writing or verbally, that his claim 
had questionable merit, they promised to "prepare the pleadings from the information" he 
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submitted to them. See index at 613. 
This Memorandum agreement created a new and binding agreement between the 
parties. It should not be contingent upon where Bluemel was located, since there are no such 
restrictions or limitations contained in Defendants' own agreement. 
Bluemel has clearly alleged genuine issues of material fact whether Defendants 
"prepared" any pleadings, let alone ones that would pass muster with any court. Defendants 
submitted Bluemel's hand-written petition with no editing, improvements or supporting case 
law or memorandum. Defendants' actions or inactions do not fulfill their contractual 
promise to prepare pleadings for Bluemel. 
This is a classic case in which the voluminous factual disputes should preclude the 
entry of summary judgment. 
III. There Are Various Conflicting Issues Regarding The Contracts Which 
Preclude Summary Judgment 
The procedural state of this case, in addition to the disputes over contracts, creates 
substantial issues which should preclude summary judgment. 
A review of the complete 1,000-page court file shows there is a state of confusion 
regarding certain crucial issues in this matter. For example, the Court's first order granting 
summary judgment was dated May 7, 2004. Index at 315-17. However, that order did not 
address Bluemel's First Amended Complaint, which was authorized by the order of April 28, 
2004, which granted Bluemel leave to file his First Amended Complaint. Index at 270-71. 
The Court file shows that amended complaint was deemed filed on April 28, 2004. Index at 
268-295. 
Defendants filed no response to the First Amended Complaint. Pursuant to the plain 
language of Rules 8 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Bluemel's allegations are 
deemed admitted. See Plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum, index at 560-61. This is 
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particularly crucial to the Court's instant analysis since paragraph 20 of the First Amended 
Complaint, Index at 277, stated: 
Plaintiff, in the custody of the DOC, by and through the state of Utah, 
therefore is a named and duty recognized beneficiary (Third Party Beneficiary) 
of Contract #'s 98-6723, 98-6774, and 99-6581. These are the contracts that 
service the State and County Correctional Facilities where Bluemel was 
housed at and transferred to and from during the relevant times prior to the 
filing of this lawsuit. Being that Bluemel was transferred between facilities 
does not materially alter the scope of performance the Defendants were 
obligated to perform, including Third Party Beneficiary. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has pled violations of all potential contracts, which overcomes the 
technicality upon which Defendants' entire motion for summary judgment is based. 
Defendants argue Bluemel has sued under the wrong contract; an argument adopted by the 
lower court. See Amended Order, Index at 907. Defendants fail to mention that they still 
have never produced any contract to Bluemel. As a pro se party, Bluemel simply secured the 
contract, number 986723, pursuant to a GRAMA request. 
The mere fact the Second Amended Complaint does not contain or identify other 
contracts should not be fatal to Bluemelfs claims. Since the initial problems between 
Bluemel and Defendants arose at CUCF and under contract 986723, and all future problems 
were triggered by those early misrepresentations from January 2000, all claims can be traced 
back to that event. 
In addition, Defendants1 bid proposal was incorporated by reference into contract 
986723. Pursuant to attachment C to the original contract, it was contemplated Defendants 
would provide services even after inmates moved to other facilities or outside the state when 
their causes of action arose while housed in Utah. See index at 603-11 and Addendum to 
Brief. 
Defendants' bid proposal went several steps further. They solicited the bid by 
claiming that since they were already servicing the "North Point, South Point, Iron County 
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and County Jail facilities," it would be advantageous to the CUCF inmates for Defendants 
to service all such inmates. "It is certain that many of the inmates ... will be transferred back 
and forth between the Central Utah Correctional Facility and the other facilities. [I]t is likely 
many of the inmates which will be transferred to the Central Utah Correctional Facility will 
still need follow up on these matters." See copy of Defendants' bid proposal, index at 603-
11. Defendants further stated that these transfers "would not interfere with any legal services 
that the inmates have requested." IcL 
Based upon the plain language of these contracts and their incorporated provisions and 
attachments - and since his issues began under the initial contract - Bluemel believed he 
was suing under the correct contract. Defendants' contract analysis is amiss, and they are not 
entitled to summary judgment. 
Bluemel is the exact type of inmate that Defendants envisioned when they submitted 
their bid proposal. Bluemel has been transferred back and forth between various facilities. 
He obviously needed follow up on his matters. It also was vital that these transfers "not 
interfere with any legal services that the inmates have requested." Therefore, Bluemel should 
not be denied his status as a third-party beneficiary to the contracts by moving from CUCF 
to Garfield County Jail, etc. 
The case law, and the basic law of contracts, support Bluemel's position that 
Defendants' narrow interpretation of this contract is incorrect. "A writing is interpreted as 
a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202, "Rules in Aid of Interpretation," at 86 (1981). 
The Restatement also states, "Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of 
all the circumstances ..." Id. at § 202(1). Further, "[mjeaning is inevitably dependant on 
context." Id. at § 202 comment d. 
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In the leading treatise on contracts, Corbin on Contracts: Interpretation of Contracts, 
it states "a frequently stated and useful rule is that the terms of a contract are to be interpreted 
and their legal effects determined as a whole." M. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts, § 24.21 
"Interpretation of the Contract as a Whole," at 204 (1998). 
In many instances, however, the terms of agreement may be expressed in two 
or more separate documents, some of these containing promises and statements 
as to consideration, and others, such as deeds, mortgages and trust indentures, 
embodying performances agreed upon rather than a statement of terms to be 
performed. In every such case, these documents should be interpreted 
together, each one assisting in determining the meaning intended to be 
expressed by the others. 
There are a number of cases in which courts have held that all documents 
involved in a transaction should be viewed together.. . 
Internal references in one document to another are often helpful in the 
processes of interpretation and adjudication, but the absence of such a 
reference does not make a document unusable in these processes or 
inadmissible in evidence. 
Id. at §24.21 at 216, 226. 
In the instant action, the contract or contracts should be determined as a whole. The 
contract cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The contract includes not only the attachments 
which were actually attached to the agreement, but also Defendants' bid response which is 
"incorporated into this contract by reference but not attached." See Contract 986723 at 1, 
index at 592 and Addendum to Brief. Such a reference clearly is "helpful in the process of 
interpretation and adjudication." 
Assuming arguendo that Bluemel did not refer to or attach the correct contract, many 
of the actions took place while he was housed in the Garfield County Jail. His contract claim 
still is not barred based upon Defendants' intent that no inmate would fall through the cracks 
simply because they were transferred from one facility to another. Defendants would ensure 
that all such inmates would receive the follow up necessary and any transfers "would not 
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interfere with any legal services that the inmates have requested." Since Defendants had the 
exclusive contracts for all facilities in question at that time, it is almost incredulous they are 
attempting to avoid liability on such a perceived technicality. 
Defendants claim there was never any intent on the part of the contracting parties of 
the CUCF contract to include any state inmates housed in any facilities other than CUCF. 
This disputed issue boils down to the terms of the contract and intent of the contracting 
parties. 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be 
interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary judgment. If the evidence 
as to the terms of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the 
terms of the agreement is to be determined by the jury. 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) (citations 
omitted.) 
Defendants claim the contracting parties had separate agreements for each facility 
which houses state inmates, and when an inmate transfers, any services by which the 
Defendants were obligated to perform for the inmate were discharged upon said transfer. 
This leaves the inmate in a precarious situation because he is not guaranteed any housing 
assignment and can be transferred at any time, as in Bluemefs case. Such a position is 
contrary to the ideal situation portrayed by Defendants when they were soliciting the bid. 
They cannot renege on the duties set forth in their contracts and proposals. 
Even if the majority of Bluemel's claims arose under contract number 986774 while 
in the Garfield County Jail, he still has a valid contract claim under 986723 for Defendants' 
actions while he was at CUCF. During the initial interview with Defendant Angerhofer on 
or about January 24, 2000, Bluemel was informed by Defendant that his case involved 
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B and that it was governed by a four-year statute of 
limitations. He not only was informed orally, but also in writing. See index at 397-400. It 
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was not until much later in 2000 when Defendants changed their mind and informed Bluemel 
his case was governed by a one-year statute of limitations and was one under Rule 65C for 
post-conviction relief. But for the original misguided statute of limitations information, 
Bluemel would not have been placed into the position where he was scrambling to provide 
information to Defendants for his petition within a month or so of the pending deadline. 
Bluemel was originally advised and counseled to a particular course of action upon 
which to proceed. He reasonably relied on the representations of Defendants, and after he 
was transferred he brought the information to the Defendants as per their memorandum 
promise. 
Bluemel reasonably relied on Defendants' representations as being true and accurate 
upon initially seeking their services. Bluemel was not timely nor accurately informed of the 
actual statute of limitations and was provided with incorrect information upon which he 
reasonably relied. Bluemel was not provided with accurate information in Defendants1 
Extraordinary Relief packet upon which he could proceed. Defendants' contract 986723 
states the importance of assisting inmates with providing an appeal packet upon the dismissal 
of a habeas Petition. Defendants provided the promised appeal packet, but did so months 
after the time to appeal had passed. Plaintiffs Affidavit at Tf 29, Index at 649. 
In order for SLCC to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and 
send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its 
(legal) theory. ... It is only necessary for SLCC to show "facts" controverting 
the "facts" stated in Hood's affidavit. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Although Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint may be somewhat poorly drafted 
for even a pro se pleading, it nevertheless, when considered along with the provisions from 
the contract and those incorporated by reference, presents a prima facie case. It establishes 
a third party beneficiary status and states several claims upon which relief can be granted. 
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There are genuine issues of material fact regarding contract 986723 to overcome the 
summary judgment ruling. The issues of the terms of the contract, the intent of parties, and 
Defendants' liability should be resolved by the jury. Other factual disputes involve the 
information Defendants conveyed to Bluemel about where to file other petitions. 
A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed in the county in which the judgment 
of conviction was entered. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b). Bluemel was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County. Therefore, Bluemel's second petition, as well as another 
petition, were dismissed at least in part because they were filed in the wrong county — all 
based upon information Defendants provided to Bluemel. See Index at 657-58. 
IV. Defendants Had An Obligation To Provide Some Assistance On Appeal 
to Bluemel Based Upon Their Contract Bid Proposals Which Promised To Provide 
Appeal Packets To Inmates. 
The lower court found Defendants "were under no contractual obligations to provide 
an appeal for Bluemel." See Amended Order at f^ 1, Index at 906. 
Bluemel argues Defendants were required to assist him with some matters related to 
an appeal after the denial of his original petition. Defendants promised certain services for 
appeal based upon the bid proposal in which they agreed to provide appeal packets to assist 
inmates at that stage of the process. 
Defendants' contract 986723 states the importance of assisting inmates with providing 
an appeal packet upon the dismissal of a habeas petition. Defendants provided the promised 
appeal packet to Bluemel, but did so months after the time to appeal had passed. Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at ^ 29, Index at 649. 
In offering to put together an appeal packet for inmates, Defendants stated in their 
"Particularly Beneficial Proposal" portion of their bid response, f?[t]his is not a requirement 
under Bounds v. Smith, however, the offerors believe the inmates are in desperate need of 
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some assistance when their case is denied." See Bid Proposal at 6 (emphasis added), index 
at 609. 
Bluemel did not file an appeal on the denial of his Rule 65C Petition because he was 
never informed about any appeal rights - or the importance of an appeal - by Defendants. 
(The Order of Dismissal with Prejudice also did not mention any right to appeal. Index at 
738-742.) In response, he filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, this time in the 
Sixth District Court, Case No. 01060003. The decision to file in the Sixth District Court -
instead of in the Third District Court - was based upon information provided to him by 
Defendants. That second petition was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
At the very least, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendants' 
potential liability for failure to provide a timely appeal packet or any appeal information to 
Bluemel or for any misrepresentations made to him. 
V. If Bluemel Sued Under The Wrong Contract It Was Because He Did Not 
Know About Separate Contracts and Defendants Did Not Provide The Correct 
Contract Through Discovery. 
Defendants state that Bluemel knew or should have known that the Garfield County 
Jail was governed by a separate contract other than that for CUCF or South Point. See 
Defendants' Memorandum at 8, index at 510. Clearly, when Bluemel began this litigation, 
he had no idea there were separate contracts. 
Bluemel simply met with Defendants at different facilities, while discussing the same 
claims and issues which needed to be filed in his post-conviction relief petition. Bluemel had 
no way of knowing there were separate contracts governing each facility, or that each time 
Bluemel was moved he was then governed by a different contact. During the time in 
question, 2000 and 2001, Bluemel just knew that he was desperately in need of legal 
services, the contract attorneys were the only ones who answered the call for such services, 
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and they failed to assist him in the most important pleading of his life. 
When Defendants filed their verified answer to Plaintiffs Second Amended 
Complaint, it contained no allegation or affirmative defense that Bluemel had sued upon the 
wrong contract. See Answer, index at 471-72. 
Defendants never raised the improper contract theory throughout discovery, and 
certainly never provided the "correct" contract in any response to Bluemef s various requests 
for production of documents. 
As Bluemel went through the litigation process over the years, he learned there was 
an initial contract that governed while he was at the Utah State Prison. Bluemel later 
received contract number 986723, which he genuinely believed would cover his remaining 
dealings with Defendants because that is where he was housed when first dealing with the 
Defendants. Further, the documents incorporated into the contract by reference stated that 
many inmates will be transferred back and forth between facilities and Defendants did not 
want any interference with the legal services for the inmates after any transfer. See 
Defendants' Bid Proposal, Index at 610-11 and attached as Addendum to Brief. 
Defendants provided incorrect information about the courts in which Bluemel should 
file his subsequent petitions. He filed two later petitions in Garfield County, only to have 
them dismissed for being filed in the wrong court. All petitions should have been filed in 
Salt Lake County, which was the court of original jurisdiction for Bluemel. See Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at % 46, Index at 653, timelines and summaries at 657-58. 
VI. The Lower Court's Failure To Resolve The Motions To Compel 
Discovery And The Issue Of The Missing Documents Constitutes Reversible Error. 
Bluemel's defense to the summary judgment motion was supported by the Rule 56(f) 
Affidavit of Attorney David W. Brown. The Affidavit outlined the issue that three pending 
motions to compel discovery needed to be resolved before the summary judgment matter was 
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resolved. See index at 632-35. 
The motions to compel were fully addressed at the June 12, 2007, motions hearing. 
See transcript at 1, 14,33-36, and 41-42. Bluemel secured the contract upon which he sued 
based upon a contract he received pursuant to a GRAMA request. Throughout discovery, 
he requested Defendants to produce any outstanding documents which had not been 
previously provided. If Defendants had provided the correct contact in response to the 
various discovery requests, there would have been no basis for Defendants' summary 
judgment motion. See discovery pleadings, index at 145-228,262-67,355-56,357-361,448-
450, and 451-459. 
The failure to rule upon or to grant BluemeFs Rule 56(f) motion constitutes reversible 
error. "It is generally held that rule 56(f) motions should be granted liberally to provide 
adequate opportunity for discovery because information gained during discovery may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482,488 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 827 P.2d 
212 (Utah 1992). 
"Generally, summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete ..." 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
One of the most crucial issues in this case is that no one has been able to ascertain 
what documents Defendants attached to the original petition. Defendants have 
acknowledged attaching certain documents, but a review of those documents and the Court's 
order dismissing the original petition, seemingly show that the most crucial exhibits — the 
detailed medical records from Valley Mental Health and the Social Security Administration 
— were not attached to the petition. 
The contract in question required Defendants to maintain accurate records on each 
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case or inmate. Bluemel has conducted discovery on this issue, but has not received the 
requested medical records which he submitted to their office. 
At the close of the June 12, 2007, motions hearing, the court took the matter under 
advisement and requested Bluemel5s counsel to track down the file related to his original 
petition. That file had been missing from the Third District Court, and Bluemel's counsel 
had been unable to locate it or review it. However, after the hearing it was determined the 
original habeas corpus petition file had been destroyed. At that time, Bluemel's counsel 
secured from the office of the Attorney General a copy of the original file which had been 
submitted to it from the court. That file was submitted to the lower court as part of the post-
hearing affidavit of David W. Brown on or about June 21, 2007. See index at 747-863. 
Unfortunately, the court granted the motion for summary judgement via its minute 
entry of June 20, 2007. Therefore, the court granted the motion without waiting for 
Bluemel's response to the court's inquiry regarding the missing file. The court's premature 
dismissal was ill advised at best. 
Why the lower court specifically instructed Bluemel's counsel to retrieve the habeas 
corpous petition file but then entered its ruling before determining the whereabouts of the file 
or what the contents might be, is left to mere speculation. 
Based upon the June 21, 2007, affidavit of Bluemel's counsel, the conclusion can be 
made that the petition filed by Defendants upon behalf of Bluemel did not contain records 
from Valley Mental Health, the Social Security Administration, etc. See Index at 747-863. 
Bluemel's positon is supported by the June 14, 2007, letter of Christopher D. Ballard, 
Assistant Attorney General, along with the letter of that date provided to counsel 103 pages, 
including four color copies of photographs, which constitutes an entire duplicate of the post-
conviction file the Third District Court provided to the Office of the Attorney General. See 
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index at 759-863. 
Not only did the court grant summary judgment without requiring Defendants to 
comply with the outstanding discovery requests, but it did so before reviewing the file 
submitted by Assistant Attorney General Christopher Ballard. 
The outstanding discovery items are too numerous to mention in this Brief, but all are 
contained in the record. See index at 145-228,262-67,355-56, 357-361,448-450, and 451-
459. 
On or about June 25, 2004, Bluemel filed his pro se motion for order to compel 
production of documents, and order. See index at 355. Bluemel requested the court 
... to order the Defendants to produce documents that they have been evasive 
in disclosing and elusive in providing knowledge of. The Defendants have not 
fully and completely provided documents as the Plaintiff requested, nor have 
the Defendants answered interrogatories that would have disclosed the 
existence of relevant documents. 
Motion for Order to Compel Production of Documents, and Order, index at 355. 
As part of the supporting memorandum, Bluemel requested "14. Any and all other 
documents the Defendants failed to identify in previous interrogatories or discovery 
requests." See index at 360. See Minute Entry at 362, in which the lower court accurately 
stated it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the discovery dispute because the case was on appeal. 
However, once the court authorized the Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint via 
order dated June 21,2005, Bluemel refilled his discovery motions. See index at 442,448-50, 
451-459. The documents requested again by Bluemel were: "14. Any and all other 
documents the Defendants have failed to identify to the Plaintiff heretofore." Index at 454. 
Defendants failed to provide any new documents, particularly never disclosed contract 
number 986774, which Defendants now maintain is the correct contract governing all their 
dealings with Bluemel while incarcerated at the Garfield County Jail in 2000. 
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In anticipation of the hearing on the summary judgment issue, Bluemel submitted a 
Notice to Submit for Decision on his Motions to Compel dated May 27,2003, June 25,2004, 
and August 8, 2005. Index at 626-27, 628-29, 630-31. 
The court agreed to hear the motions to compel discovery at the same time as the 
summary judgment matter, and acknowledged such on the record at the outset of the June 12, 
2007, hearing. See transcript of hearing at 1. 
For Defendants to refuse to provide relevant documents such as the real contract in 
question, despite valid demands from the pro se plaintiff, and then seek dismissal because 
Bluemel has not based his claim upon the correct contract, seems patently unfair and 
unreasonable. As the pro se Bluemel stated, Defendants "have been evasive in disclosing 
and elusive in providing knowledge o f crucial documents or contracts. Index at 355. 
Defendants should be ordered to produce the proper contract, number 986774. The 
case should be then reversed and remanded for trial. 
VII. The Lower Court Erred When It Found Bluemel Had Not Been Damaged 
Because The Original Petition Was Dismissed On Its Merits. 
The Amended Order states "Bluemel was not damaged because the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief was dismissed by the District Court on its merits." See Amended Order 
at Tf3, index at 907. 
Although there are various disputed factual issues in this case, there is no area in 
which the factual disputes are more rampant than in the area of damages. In fact, Bluemel 
believes his potential damages in this case are extraordinary. After the original petition was 
dismissed and no appeal was filed, Bluemel's two subsequent appeals were dismissed based 
upon the original petition being dismissed. 
Rule 65C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party seeking post-
conviction relief to "set forth all claims that the petitioner has." Since all claims were not 
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included in the rough draft petition filed by Defendants, Bluemel lost the opportunity forever 
to raise those crucial matters with any court. In addition, Defendants' failure to submit a 
sufficient factual record has affected each of Bluemel's subsequent efforts to obtain any 
relief. Bluemel now has no remedy to correct Defendants' mistakes or to file a legally 
cognizable petition. 
Defendants' argument that "Bluemel has failed to plead facts indicating that any 
failure of Defendant to provide legal services caused him damage" is an issue in total dispute. 
See Defendants' summary judgment memorandum at 10, Index at 512. Defendants argue 
Bluemel's original petition could not have been dismissed "due to any deficiencies on the 
part of Defendants." However, Defendants conveniently ignore the fact that they originally 
were mistaken about a four year statute of limitations, then later miscalculated the statute of 
limitations by a full 40 days — which apparently forced a rushed and incomplete petition to 
be filed without any revisions whatsoever. A review of the hand-written petition shows 
Bluemel never intended such a draft be filed with the court. Defendants' failure to submit 
the crucial medical records and supporting documents to the Court is inexcusable. Plaintiffs 
Affidavit at 636-58, Affidavit of David W. Brown at 747-863. 
Since Defendants' Motion and damage argument deal in part with proximate cause, 
the factual disputes are even more important. 
"Proximate cause is a factual issue that generally cannot be resolved as a matter of 
law." Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Because proximate cause is an 
issue of fact, we refuse to take it from the jury if there is any evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury could infer causation." Id. In this instance, factual disputes are rampant, as 
described throughout the Statement of the Facts. 
In Harlinev. Baker, 912 P.2d 433,439 (Utah 1996), the court stated: "Generally, the 
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question of proximate cause raises an issue of fact fto be submitted to the jury for its 
determination.'" Id. at 439 quoting Mitchell v. Pearson Entrs., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 
1985). 
Under Harline, proximate cause is defined as that event that "necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Id. In the instant action, Bluemel has 
forever lost his right to challenge his conviction or proceed with a valid habeas corpus 
petition. Defendants' actions which led to this dismal state of affairs were twice 
miscalculating the statute of limitations within which time to file his petitions, not properly 
researching or drafting the petition, including a hand-written petition which was only 
designed or intended for Defendants to consider, failing to provide any information or packet 
relative to appealing the denial of the petition, and failure to submit crucial medical records 
to the court which were delivered to Defendants' office by Bluemel's parents. All of these 
issues involve genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. 
In Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1999), it states: 
Proximate cause is generally determined by an examination of the facts, and 
questions of fact are to be decided by the jury. Thus, courts should refuse to 
grant a directed verdict on issues of causation if there is any evidence which 
might lead a reasonable jury to find a causal connection between a breach and 
a subsequent injury. 
Id. at 938 (citations omitted). 
The instant case is one in which the parties agree on few material facts. The number 
of genuine issues of material fact shows this is a case in which the factual disputes should 
be decided by the jury or the ultimate fact finder -- not at the summary judgment stage. 
VIII. Defendants Failed To Provide Bluemel With Any Meaningful Access To 
The Court Pursuant To Bounds v. Smith. 
Bluemel maintains Defendants breached their duties to Bluemel by failing to provide 
him with meaningful access to the court relative to his habeas corpus relief. Bounds v. 
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Smith. 430 U.S. 817, 821-828 (1977). 
Under Bounds, it is considered essential that inmates receive legal assistance to help 
frame their habeas corpus documents. Id. at 825. The Court also explained that even though 
pro se pleadings are viewed under "less stringent standards ... it is often more important that 
a prisoner complaint set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural prerequisites, since 
the court may pass on the complaint's sufficiencies before allowing filing in forma pauperis 
and may dismiss the case if it is deemed frivolous." Id. at 826. 
It is somewhat ironic that Defendants' bid proposal states unequivocally that their 
contractual obligations to inmates far exceed the minimum constitutional requirements set 
forth in Bounds v. Smith. Appendix C-l at 6, Index at 609. 
Defendants misrepresented various issues, including the 4-year statute of limitations 
within which time Bluemel had to file his action. Defendants breached the plain language 
of their ''Memorandum" to Bluemel dated January 31, 2000, by not assessing the merits of 
his case, preparing any legally sufficient pleadings, etc. Index at 613. Instead, Defendants 
filed a hand-written pleading - which document clearly was not intended to be filed with 
the court, but was simply for the use of Defendants in preparing the proper petition. 
Bluemel reasonably relied upon the promises and representations of his appointed 
contract counsel. See e.g., Bounds. 430 U.S. at 821-828; Lewis v. Casey. 116 S.Ct. 2174, 
2177-2178(1996). 
Bluemel, who suffers from an organic brain injury and diminished mental capacity 
which resulted in him receiving Social Security disability, experienced symptoms such as 
"dizzy spells and memory loss, became easily confused, had great difficulty reading, and 
frequently became disoriented. The full extent to which his organic brain injury affected the 
proceedings that resulted in a procedural default are still being considered. The key medical 
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records submitted by Bluemel to Defendants apparently have been misplaced « and were not 
submitted to the Court to strengthen the Petition. 
The contract attorneys, Defendants, were Bluemel's only meaningful access to the 
courts for habeas corpus relief. Bluemel relied upon their advice and representation to have 
a petition properly prepared and prosecuted, including an appeal of the same if necessary, and 
keeping him reasonably informed of the proceedings therein. 
It appears the combination of Bluemel's organic brain injury and his appointed 
contract attorneys' failure to provide him with "meaningful access to the court" for habeas 
corpus relief that caused the procedural default. 
These issues involve general issues of material fact which should not be resolved 
without a trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower court's summary 
judgment ruling and remand the matter for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2008. 
David W. Brc 
Attorney for Bluemel/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT were hand-delivered this 16th day of April, 2008, to the following: 
David J. Angerhofer 
Wayne A. Freestone 
Crescent Square, #11 
11075 S. State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 &LWJ&. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. PERTINENT RULES 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplp-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided m this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend- satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the 
ment substituted "move for summary judg- beginning of the first sentence m Subdivision 
m£f x°rr m ° V e ° r W l t h ° U t s uPP° r t mS (g), and made stylistic changes throughout 
affidavits for a summary judgmentin his favor" Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to 
in Subdivisions (a) and (b), in Subdivision (c),
 R u l e 56 FR C P 
deleted "filed and served" before "m accordance
 r , ' p ^ ™ ™ , ^ n x 
with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501", ^T^lftoTl "~ C o n t e m p t g^erally, 
176 177 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 54 
3nce and the original 
>tice of the filing. 
;hout a jury the court 
erroneous. Within 10 
report any party may 
pplication to the court 
hall be by motion and 
learing may adopt the 
a part or may receive 
y the master shall not 
le issues submitted to 
nd may be read to the 
LS in point of law which 
,er's report is the same 
erence; but, when the 
3e final, only questions 
idered. 
3r may submit a draft 
iving their suggestions. 
y object to the appoint-
5 a party may challenge 
[ action. Such objections 
le manner as a motion. 
ices. — Challenging of jurors 
P. 47(f). 
»intment by investigating and 
issue of attorney's fees since 
dready ordered an award of 
nd the parties had no notice 
was to review that award nor 
Lave an opportunity to partici-
tster's proceedings. Plumb v. 
T34 (Utah 1990). 
ial officer. 
ter has the duties and obliga-
al officer, and thus should not 
ical ex parte contacts with the 
I the case on matters pertinent 
'of the referral. Plumb v. State, 
tah 1990). 
es Waldo, Holbrook & McDon-
i, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996); 
re E.H.), 2006 UT 36, 137 R3d 
»r, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. 
cessor or substituted master or 
ar decision or enter judgment on 
rd by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d 
lure to file report within time 
atute, court order, or stipulation 
' reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
What are "exceptional conditions" justifying 
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1 
AL.R. Fed. 922. 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form, "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and 
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall 
not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and I or involving multiple parities. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, 
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state 
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs 
are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
B. AMENDED ORDER 
FILED DESTBECT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
urn 2 ? 2007 
David J. Angerhofer, PC #4789 
Wayne A. Freestone, PC #4481 
Attorney at Law 
11075 South State Street, #11 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Tele: 801-428-1730 
Fax: 801-428-1731 
By. 1 1 5 SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cr§'rk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARREN C. BLUEMEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE, and 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER, 
individually, and d/b/a/ [respectively] 












Judge: Robert Faust 
Civil No: 020906503 
The above matter came before the Court on Defendants', Wayne A. Freestone, P.C. and 
David J. Angerhofer P.C, Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties appeared before the 
Court on June 12, 2007, for oral arguments. Plaintiff was represented by David W. Brown. 
Defendants appeared pro se. Based upon the Memorandum and other documentation submitted 
by the parties and the court's file herein and good cause appearing, the Court enters the 
following Amended Order 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Plaintiffs Second 
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for the following reasons: 
1. Defendants were under no contractual obligations to provide an appeal for the 
plaintiff; 
2. Plaintiff sued under the wrong legal contract; and 
3. Plaintiff was not damaged because the Petition for Post Conviction Relief was 
dismissed by the District Court on its merits. 
DATED thisjffiday of November, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Order was mailed 
postage pre-paid, first class mail to the following: 
David W. Brown 
Blake Professional Plaza 
2880 West 4700 South, Suite F 
West Valley City, Utah 84118 
DATED this (g_ day of November, 2007. 
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C. CONTRACT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CONTRACT # 9 8 6 7 2 3 
UDC FILE # 90B-630-IO/G 
1. CONTRACTING PARTIES: This contract is between the Utah Department of Corrections (hereafter, 
"UDC"), 6100 South Fashion Blvd., Murray, Utah 84107, and: 
NAME: Wayne A Freestone LEGAL STATUS OF CONTRACTOR 
David J. Angerhofer 
ADDRESS: 50 W. Broadway Ste 900 [ ] Sole Proprietor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2033 [ ] Non-Profit Corporation 
[ ] For-Profit Corporation 
TELEPHONE: (801) 328-5600 [ ] Partnership 
FAX: (801) 328-5651 [ ] Government Agency 
[XJSole Practitioners 
Hereafter referred to as "CONTRACTOR." 
UDC ACCOUNTING INFORMATION: Fund 100 Agency 410 Low Org 4105 Approp. Unit MCC 
Object Code 6138 Utah Vendor (Freestone # 46455B ) (Angerhofer # 57337H Commodity Code 96150 
Federal Tax ID (Freestone #87-0518418) (Angerhofer #87-0517239) 
2. GENERAL PURPOSE OF CONTRACT: Provide inmates legal services at Central Utah Correctional 
Facility (CUCF), Gunnison, Utah. 
3. PROCUREMENT: we enter into this contract as a result of the procurement process on Requisition 
number RX 410 84000000040 bid # RM8252. 
4. CONTRACT PERIOD: Effective date beginning July 1,1998 and the termination date will be June 30, 
2003, unless terminated early or extended in accordance with the terms and conditions of this contract. 
5. CONTRACT COSTS: CONTRACTOR will be paid a maximum of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE 
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND ZERO CENTS ($325,000.00) for costs authorized by this contract. ( $60,000.00 
for defined services + $5,000.00 cost for additional services described in the contract = $65,000.00 for each 
fiscal year.) 
6. ATTACHMENT A: Utah Division of Purchasing's Standard Terms and Conditions 
ATTACHMENT B: Utah Department of Corrections' Standard Terms and Conditions 
ATTACHMENT C: Scope of Work 
Any conflict between Attachment A and other Attachments will be resolved in favor of Attachment A. 
7. DOCUMENTS INCORPORATED INTO THIS CONTRACT BY REFERENCE BUT NOT ATTACHED: 
a. All other governmental laws, regulations, or actions applicable to the goods and/or services authorized 
by this contract. 
b. Utah State Procurement Code, Procurement Rules, and CONTRACTOR'S response to Bid # RM 
8252, dated May 5, 1998. 
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CONTRACT # 9J-lll3> 
UDC FILE # 90B-630-IO/G 
GRAMA 
PLEASED 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties sign and cause the contract to be executed 
CONTRACTOR STATE of UTAH 
\ 
•A l\ At h If 
Wayn^A Freestone / Date 
&~~^ . \>-»r<\% 
Fred VanDerveur, Director / Date 
Division of Institutional Operations 
David J Angerhdfer , I Date 
APPROVING AUTHORITIES 
UDC Administrative g^Fvices / Date' / 
JUN 1 2 1998 
Utah Division of Purchasing / Date 
& ~ 
UDC Bureau of Financial Services / Date Utah Division of Finance / Date 
(>(<*(** 
A 
Warden/Administrator / / /Date 
^&ym (fi/n / ^ 
GBAMA 
ATTACHMENT A - " " ^ ^ _ _ — 
UTAH DIVISION OF PURCHASING STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS (6-97) 
1. AUTHORITY Provisions of this contract are pursuant to the authority set forth in Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, Utah State Procurement Rules (Utah Administrative Code Section R33), and related 
statutes which permit the STATE to purchase certain specified services, and other approved purchases for the STATE 
2. CONTRACT JURISDICTION The provisions of this contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah 
3. RECORDS ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTOR shall maintain, or supervise the maintenance of all records 
necessary to properly account for the payments made to CONTRACTOR for costs authorized by this contract These 
records shall be retained by CONTRACTOR for at least four years after the contract termination, or until all audits 
initiated within the four years, have been completed, whichever is later 
4. AUDIT OF RECORDS CONTRACTOR agrees to allow STATE and Federal auditors, and STATE Agency Staff, 
access to all the records to this contract, for audit and inspection, and monitoring of services Such access will be 
during normal business hours, or by appointment 
5. CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONTRACTOR represents that none of its officers or employees are officers or 
employees of the State of Utah, unless disclosure has been made as required by §67-16-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 
6. CONTRACTOR, AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR shall be an independent contractor, and as 
such, shall have no authorization, express or implied, to bind the STATE to any agreements, settlements, liability, or 
understanding whatsoever, and agrees not to perform any acts as agent for the STATE, except as herein expressly set 
forth Compensation stated herein shall be the total amount payable to the CONTRACTOR by the STATE The 
CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for the payment of all income tax and social security amounts due as a result of 
payments received from the STATE for these contract services Persons employed by the STATE and acting under the 
direction of the STATE shall not be deemed to be employees or agents of the CONTRACTOR 
7. INDEMNITY CLAUSE CONTRACTOR agrees to indemnity, save harmless, and release the STATE OF UTAH, and 
all its officers, agents, volunteers, and employees from and against any and all loss, damages, injury, liability, suits, and 
proceedings arising out of the performance of this contract which are caused in whole or in part by the negligence of 
CONTRACTOR'S officers, agents, volunteers, or employees, but not for claims arising from the State's sole negligence 
8. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY CLAUSE CONTRACTOR agrees to abide by the provisions of Titles VI and VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U S C §2000e et seq , as amended) which prohibits discrimination against any employee or 
applicant for employment or any applicant or recipient of services, on the basis of race, religion, color, or national origin, 
and further agrees to abide by Executive Order No 11246, as amended, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex, 45 CFR 90 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disabilities Also the 
CONTRACTOR agrees to abide by Utah's Executive Order, dated June 30, 1989, which prohibits sexual harassment in 
the work place 
9. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE A declaration by any court, or any other binding legal source, that any provision of this 
contract is illegal and void shall not affect the legality and enforceability of any other provision of this contract, unless 
said provisions are mutually dependent 
10. RENEGOTIATION OR MODIFICATIONS This contract may be amended, modified, or supplemented only by 
written amendment to the contract, executed by the parties hereto, and attached to the original signed copy of the 
contract 
11. DEBARMENT CONTRACTOR certifies that neither it nor its principals are presently debarred, suspended, 
proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this transaction (contract) by 
any governmental department or agency If CONTRACTOR cannot certify this statement, attach a written explanation 
for review by the STATE 
12. TERMINATION Unless otherwise stated in the Special Terms and Conditions, this contract may be terminated, 
with or without cause, in advance of the specified expiration date, by either party, upon 30 days prior written notice 
being given the other party On termination of this contract, ail accounts and payments will be processed according to 
the financial arrangements set forth herein for approved services rendered to date of termination 
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RELEASED „ ~ — 
13. SALES TAX EXEMPTION The State of Utah's sales and use tax exemption number is E33399 The tangible 
personal property or services being purchases are being paid from State funds and used in the exercise of that entity s 
essential functions If the items being purchased are construction materials, they will be converted into real property by 
employees of this government entity, unless otherwise stated in the contract 
14. WARRANTY (including year 2000), The contractor agrees to warrant and assume responsibility for each hardware, 
firmware, and/or software product (hereafter called the product) that it licenses, or sells, to the State of Utah under this 
contract The contractor acknowledges that the Uniform Commercial Code applies to this contract 
In general, the contractor warrants that (1) the product will do what the salesperson said it would do, (2) the product will 
live up to all specific claims that the manufacturer makes in their advertisements, (3) the product will be suitable for the 
ordinary purposes for which such product is used, (4) the product will be suitable for any special purposes that the State 
has relied on the contractor's skill or judgement to consider when it advised the State about the product, especially to 
ensure year 2000 compatibility and fitness, (5) the product has been properly designed and manufactured, and (6) 
the product is free of significant defects or unusual problems about which the State has not been warned 
In general, "year 2000 compatibility and-fitness" means (1) the product warranted by the contractor will not cease to 
perform before, during, and after the calendar year 2000, (2) the product will not produce abnormal, invalid, and/or 
incorrect results before, during, or after the calendar year 2000, (3) will include, but not limited to, date data century 
recognition, calculations thai accommodate same century and multi-century formats, date data values that reflect 
century, and (4) accurately process date data (including, but not limited to calculating, comparing, and sequencing) 
from, into, and between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including leap year calculations 
If problems arise, the contractor will repair or replace (at no charge to the State) the product whose noncompliance is 
discovered and made known to the contractor in wnting If there is a Year 2000 problem, the contractor agrees to 
immediately assign senior engineering staff to work continuously until the product problem is corrected, time being of the 
essence 
Nothing in this warranty will be construed to limit any rights or remedies the State of Utah may otherwise have under this 
contract with respect to defects other than Year 2000 performance 
End
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ATTACHMENT B 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. Assignment and Delegation Neither party shall assign any right or delegate any duty under this contract without 
the express written and signed consent of the other party 
2. Attorney's Fees If either party brings an action, in law or equity, to compel the performance of, or to recover for the 
breach of, any agreement, covenant, or promise contained in this contract, the non-prevailing party shall pay the 
prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees, the amount of any judgment, and all costs incurred 
3. Contract Formation No legally enforceable rights or duties shall arise between the parties under this contract until 
(a) the respective representatives of CONTRACTOR and UDC sign the comract, and (b) the contract is approved and 
signed by the respective representatives of the UDC Office of Administrative Services, the UDC Bureau of Financial 
Services, and the State of Utah's Divisions of Purchasing and Finance 
4. Contractor Access to UDC Facilities UDC shall have the right to deny CONTRACTOR'S agents and 
employees-or the agents and employees of its subcontractors (if any)~access to any premises controlled, held, leased, 
or occupied by UDC if, in the sole judgement of UDC, such personnel pose a threat to any of UDC's legitimate security ' 
interests Contractor will submit to all security checks that UDC deems necessary, including, but not limited to, searches 
of person and equipment No one under the age of 18 will be allowed on property 
5. Criminal Conviction Information Upon written request by UDC, CONTRACTOR shall provide (at its own expense) 
UDC with sufficient personal information about its agents or employees-and the agents and employees of its 
subcontractors (if any)-who will enter upon premises controlled, held, leased, or occupied by UDC during the course of 
performing this contract so as to facilitate a criminal record check, at state expense, on such personnel by UDC 
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RELEASED „ — 
6 Former Felons CONTRACTOR, in executing any duty or exercising any right under this contract shall not cause or 
permit any of its agents or employees~or the agents or employees of its subcontractors (if any)-who have been 
convicted of a felony to enter upon any premises controlled, held, leased, or occupied by UDC A given crime shall be 
deemed a felony if defined as such by the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred 
7. Integration The parties declare this contract to be the final and complete expression of their agreement, and it shall 
not be contradicted, supplemented, or varied by any prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements, 
representations, or understandings 
8. Non-appropriation of Funds UDC's continued performance after the start of the State of Utah's next fiscal year is 
expressly contingent upon funds for this contract being appropriated, budgeted, or otherwise made available If funds 
are not made available for the next fiscal years, this contract will automatically terminate at the end of the current fiscal 
year 
9. Occupational Safety and Health (This clause will be considered a part of this contract only if required by law, rule, 
or regulation) CONTRACTOR represents that it is in compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) standards on blood borne pathogens set forth in 29 CFR 1910 1030, for any of the CONTRACTOR'S 
employees who provide services to UDC pursuant to this contract 
10. Paragraph and Section Headings Paragraph and section headings throughout this contract are used for the sole 
purpose of facilitating the quick location of various contract provisions Consequently, such headings do not create 
contractual rights or obligations, nor are they to be construed as a substantive part of the paragraphs or sections to 
which they belong 
11. Public Access to Contract Information This contract is a public document, and both CONTRACTOR and UDC 
shall allow members of the general public to inspect a copy of the same during their regular business hours Interested 
parties may obtain a copy of this contract at their own expense 
END OF ATTACHMENT B 
ATTACHMENT C - Additional Contract-Specific Terms 
I. Definitions: The following definitions shall be applied in construing this contract 
A. "Pleadings" 
Pleadings shall include petitions for writs of habeas corpus directed to either a federal or Utah court, 
and complaints in civil suits to be brought in either a federal or Utah court, and shall encompass all 
writs regarding decisions of the Utah Board of Pardons The term "pleading" shall also encompass all 
affidavits, motions, orders, or like documents usually considered necessary to bring legally effective 
pleadings before a court-e g , the filing of motions to proceed "In Forma Pauperis" for indigent 
inmates -and all affidavits, motions, orders or like documents considered necessary to bring legally 
effective pleadings before an administrative law judge pursuant to UDC Policy and Procedure Chapter 
Fl 15, "Involuntary Treatment" and Fir16, "Involuntary Transfer" 
B "Conditions of Confinement" lawsuits are those that allege in their pleadings that an agent, employee, 
or officer of the Utah Department of Corrections is holding the inmate-plaintiff under circumstances or 
conditions that violate rights under the U S Constitution or the Utah Constitution 
II. Scope of Services 
A Legal Assistance 
1. CONTRACTOR shall assist inmates who are incarcerated at the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility at Gunnison, Utah, in drafting and filing pleadings in both federal and state courts in 
the form of complaints in lawsuits designed to test either the legality of their incarceration or 
conditions of confinement at the facility Actions may be brought under several different legal 
theories, but typically involve lawsuits under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U S C Section 
1983, and writs of habeas corpus 
2 Assisting inmates shall consist of the following The CONTRACTOR shall 
c; 
RELEASED_ 
a visit the CUCF to interview each inmate requesting an appointment 
b keep sufficiently detailed and accurate records to thoroughly document 
CONTRACTOR'S performance under the contract, 
c screen inmate claims for mentonous legal content a claim is meritorious if it can be 
supported by a good faith argument for the extension modification or reversal of 
existing law, 
d. conduct the amount of legal research reasonably necessary to support inmate 
claims having legal merit, 
e. assist inmates in drafting pleadings setting forth inmate legal claims having legal 
merit, 
f. assist inmates in securing case law and other authority relevant to pending legal 
actions being handled by the contract attorneys, 
g assist inmates in filing legal documents within the scope of this contract by 
addressing, franking and posting inmate pleadings from the contract attorney's place 
of business, 
h asist inmates in administrative proceedings held pursuant to UDC Policy and 
Procedure Chapter Fl 15, Involuntary Treatment and Fir 16, Involuntary Transfer to 
State Mental Hospital for Treatment [Note In these cases, contract attorneys will 
provide inmates with attendance and full legal representation (including, but not 
limited to, assistance in drafting and filing pleadings, presenting evidence, cross-
examining witnesses, making objections and making oral argument) at every stage 
of UDC's involuntary treatment/involuntary transfer proceedings, cases are heard by 
UDC's Administrative Law Judge, (Duties of contract attorneys in other areas do not 
extend past the filing of pleadings)] 
i assist inmates in lawsuits in which an inmate housed at the UDC facility alleges that 
the Utah Board of Pardons has denied him parole in a manner violative of his rights 
secured under the U S Constitution or the Utah Constitution 
j provide legal services by means of telephone and/or mail to inmates housed outside 
the state of Utah whose causes of action arose while housed within the state of 
Utah, 
k screen inmate requests for photocopies of legal material not directly related to initial 
pleadings drafted by CONTRACTOR to determine if such material is in fact, legal in 
nature Request for material not legal in nature shall be returned by CONTRACTOR 
to the housing unit for disposition Material that is legal in nature shall be 
photocopied by CONTRACTOR and the copies provided to the requesting inmate 
Copies made pursuant to this subparagraph shall be at UDC expense, 
I. screen inmate-to-inmate legal mail to determine if such mail is, in fact, legal in 
nature, inmate-to-inmate mail not legal in nature shall be returned by 
CONTRACTOR to the unit for disposition, inmate-to-inmate mail that is legal in 
nature shall be forwarded by CONTRACTOR to the receiving inmate in a plain 
envelope stamped "Inmate-to-inmate Legal Mail", 
m screen inmate requests for photocopies of legal material not directly related 
to initial pleadings drafted by CONTRACTOR to determine if such material 
is, in fact, legal in nature, requests for material not legal in nature shall be 
returned by CONTRACTOR to the appropriate facility for disposition, 
material which is legal in nature shall be photocopied by CONTRACTOR and 
the photocopies provided to the requesting inmate, photocopies made 
pursuant to this subparagraph shall be at UDC expense 
c 
n. inspect legal-privileged pouches confiscated from inmates and determine d to be 
properly seized by the warden's office n accordance with UDC Policy and Procedure 
Chapter FDr 14, Inmate Property For the first referral of an inmate's legal pouch to 
CONTRACTOR for inspection, CONTRACTOR shall write a letter to the inmate 
detailing their findings with regard to the materials inspected, thoroughly explaining 
the kinds of materials that may be kept in legal pouches, and warning the inmate 
that future violations may result in disciplinary action against the inmate 
CONTRACTOR shall return the confiscated and inspected legal materials to the 
warden properly separated and categorized as "legal-privileged,n "legal-public," and 
"nonlegal," with a memorandum summarizing CONTRACTORS's findings 
o. assist only inmates in matters either 
(1) grounded in fact and supported by legal arguments that are warranted by 
existing law, or 
(2) that contains good faith arguments for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law and 
p. act as an attorney in a manner consistent with the current version of the Utah State 
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct 
3. Standard of Performance 
In performing under this contract, CONTRACTOR shall comply fully with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar (effective January 1, 1988) and the rules of 
federal and Utah courts, as applicable CONTRACTOR shall render services under this 
contract commensurate with the services that would be rendered, under the same or similar 
circumstances, by the reasonably competent and skillful attorney practicing before local 
federal and state courts 
4 Conduct Outside the Scope of the Contract 
The CONTRACTOR shall not do any of the following 
a assist inmates in advancing legal claims, which lack legal merit, 
b assist inmates in filing actions which are not directly related to either challenging a 
criminal conviction or testing conditions of confinement at the facility, 
c assist inmates in actions where another member of the bar has a preexisting legal 
obligation to provide the required assistance, or 
d. engage in any act or course of conduct that violates Department of Corrections rules 
or which reasonably could jeopardize the safety, security, and control of 
departmental operations at the facility 
Scheduling 
CONTRACTOR shall submit to all reasonable scheduling requirements mandated by UDC, be they 
currently in existence, or issued after the date this contract comes into effect 
C. Service Form 
If CONTRACTOR uses a form to initiate contact with CUCF inmates seeking legal assistance, 
CONTRACTOR shall fully explain the contents of the form in a face-to-face meeting with eafch inmate 
If any inmate exhibits a disability that would prevent him from effectively communicating his legal 
needs in written form, or if the inmate does not speak English, then CONTRACTOR shall fill out the 
form in consultation with each such inmate 
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D Assistance by Non-La_wvers 
The initial interview of inmates seeking legal assistance under this contract shall be conducted by 
current members of the Utah State Bar Thereafter, non-lawyer assistants may help provide legal 
services under this contract, provided they are carefully supervised by current members of the Utah 
State Bar, and they do not give legal advice or perform any act that would constitute the practice of 
law without a license, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 78-51-25 or any successor provision 
E Inmate Requests for Legal Assistance 
UDC shall promulgate rules to govern how CONTRACTOR shall be informed of the names and 
locations of inmates who have requested legal assistance, photocopies, or mail transfer under this 
contract 
F Time Frame of Services 
CONTRACTOR shall visit the CUCF inmates once a week CONTRACTOR shall produce pleadings 
within seven (7) days of the initial visit 
G. Inmate Communications 
CONTRACTOR shall keep mmate-chents fully informed as to the istaius of the legal services they 
request CONTRACTORS shall send inmate-clients copies of all documents prepared on their behalf 
by CONTRACTORS, including (but not necessarily limited to) affidavits, correspondence, motions, 
orders, and pleadings 
H. Monitoring Authority 
1. UDC will designate staff to oversee CONTRACTORS' performance under this contract 
CONTRACTOR shall promptly provide such monitoring authority with all materials reasonably 
required to ascertain the quantitative and qualitative nature of the legal services rendered by 
CONTRACTORS This clause shall not require the release of materials which would violate 
any attorney-client privilege existing between CONTRACTOR and any inmate-client 
CONTRACTORS shall provide timely and concise reports to a designated monitoring 
authority 
I Reporting System 
CONTRACTOR shall prepare the following types of reports and/or documentation of services 
rendered 
1. Initial Interview CONTRACTORS shall maintain a detailed record of the initial interview with 
each individual inmate-client This document shall contain, at a minimum, the inmate's full 
name, Utah State Prison identification number, housing assignment, a description of the legal 
services requested, and any pertinent comments of CONTRACTOR 
2 File Checklist Each inmate-client's file shall contain a checklist which tracks the legal 
service provided by CONTRACTOR This checklist shall be kept current The checklist 
shall contain the date and the initials of the CONTRACTOR with each of the following 
a. Date CONTRACTOR learned of inmate-client's request for legal services, 
b. Date CONTRACTOR conducted the initial interview with inmate-client, 
c Date all necessary legal research was completed, 
d. Date initial draft of pleading was completed, 
e. Date drafts of pleading were provided (mailing date or delivery date) to inmate-client 
for inspection, 
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f Date CONTRACTOR received returned pleading for revision, 
g Date CONTRACTOR obtained inmate signature on final draft of pleading 
h Date pleadings were mailed to, or filed with, appropriate court clerk, and 
i Date file was closed, along with detailed notation of final disposition 
III. Contract Cost: 
A CONTRACTOR Wages 
1 CONTRACTOR shall submit a joint itemized bill to the UDC Bureau of Financial Services for 
FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND ZERO CENTS ($5000 00), plus charges for any additional 
services rendered pursuant to this contract, on or about the first day of each month for the 
preceding month's services 
2 UDC shall pay each attorney joint invoices as follows fifty percent (50%) to Wayne A 
Freestone and fifty percent (50%) to David J Angerhofer 
B Time of Payment 
1 Payments will be made by UDC in monthly installments of FIVE THOUSANDS DOLLARS 
AND ZERO CENTS ($5,000 00) to CONTRACTOR up to the contract limit 
2 CONTRACTOR shall bill UDC by the 10th of each month for delivered services and/or 
products during the previous month Reimbursement must be made with funding allocated 
for the fiscal year in which the services were delivered 
3 Billing for June services received after July 10, deadline does not have to be reimbursed 
unless funding can be utilized from the appropriate fiscal year 
B Additional Compensation 
CONTRACTOR shall 
1 be compensated for services to out-of-state inmates at the rate of EIGHTY DOLLARS AND 
ZERO CENTS ($80 00) per hour.prorated on the basis of actual time spent, 
2 provide services other then those described above are required by interstate or federal 
compact agreements at the rate of EIGHTY DOLLARS AND ZERO CENTS ($80 00) per hour 
prorated on the basis of actual time spent, 
3 provide services not explicitly covered by the provisions of this contract performed at the 
request of UDC shall be compensated at the rate of EIGHTY DOLLARS AND ZERO CENTS 
{$80 00) per hour for actual time spent, excluding travel time unless otherwise negotiated 
and documented by the parties of this contract, travel time, if authorized by the Contract 
Coordinator, shall be reimbursed at the rates established for state employees, and 
4 be compensated for inspecting inmate legal-privileged pouches at the rate of EIGHTY 
DOLLARS ZERO CENTS ($80 00) prorated on the basis of actual time spent 
B Photocopying CONTRACTOR shall do their own photocopying but shall have access to a copy 
machine at the Utah State Prison UDC shall issue CONTRACTOR two (2) user authorization 
numbers to access the copy machine(s) as follows 
1 a user authorization number for copies made at UDC expense pursuant to Attachment B, 
paragraph 2 C, entitled "Inmate Request for Photocopies of Legal Material," and 
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2. a user authonzation number for copies made at CONTRACTORS' expense pursuant to 
Attachment B, paragraph 2 A , entitled "Legal Assistance " For copies assigned as 
CONTRACTORS' expense pursuant to this contract, UDC shall bill CONTRACTORS THREE 
CENTS (0 03) per copy at the end of the month for copies made during that period 
IV. Licensing/Insurance. 
During the entire term of this contract, including renewals, attorneys providing legal services under this contract 
shall remain active members in good standings of the Utah State Bar The licensing requirement set forth in 
this clause is of the essence, and breach of this requirement shall justify UDC in unilaterally canceling this 
contract without notice CONTRACTORS shall file annually, with the point-of-contact listed in the heading on 
the first page of this contract, an official certificate showing that the CONTRACTORS are members in good 
standing of the Utah State Bar CONTRACTORS also shall maintain liability insurance for $250,00 000 per 
occurrence, and $ 1,000,000.00 aggregate throughout the term of this contract 
V. Place of Payment: All payments by UDC to CONTRACTOR shall be sent to CONTRACTOR'S address 
appearing in page 1, fl 1 above entitled "CONTRACTING PARTIES " 
VI. Time of Payment: All payments made by UDC to CONTRACTOR shall be made in accordance with the Utah 
Prompt Payment Act, Utah Code Ann §§ 15-6-1 et. seq upon receipt of an invoice 
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PROPOSAL FOR SERVICE CONTRACT: 
LEGAL SERVICES FOR 
CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Offerors: 
Wayne A. Freestone 
David J. Angerhofer 
Bank One Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-328-5600 
ALL FORMS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE 
PROTECTED BY BUSINESS CONFIDENTIALITY 
Proposal For Service Contract: 
Legal Services For Utah State Prison 
CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Wayne A Freestone, P C and David J Angerhofer, P C, (Offerors) submit the following 
proposal for legal services for the inmates under Utah Department of Corrections jurisdiction housed 
at the Central Utah Correctional Facility Lois, Offerors legal assistant, is also authorized to represent 
Offerors in dealing with this request for proposal 
Wayne A Freestone's employer ID # is 87-0518418 
David J Angerhofer's employer DD# is 87-0517239 
Wayne A Freestone, P C and David J Angerhofer, P C are acting as two professional 
corporations in servicing the contract 
This document constitutes a proposal and is not an offer The information contained herein 
is specifically set forth as a description of how we would service this contract. 
PRICE OF SERVICES 
Offerors propose that they perform all legal services required by this contract for fiscal years 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 (July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2003), for compensation of 
$60,000 00 per year and $80 00 per hour as set forth in 5 2 of the RFP 
EXPERIENCE 
(a) Legal Experience 
Wayne Freestone has been a member of the Utah State Bar since May of 1985 and has 
more than twelve and one half years of full time practice experience in the State of Utah. (See 
attached Resume in the Appendix) 
David Angerhofer has been a member of the Utah State Bar since October, 1986, and 
has more than eleven and one half years of full time practice experience in the State of Utah. (See 
attached Resume in the Appendix) 
(b) General Civil Litigation Experience 
Wayne Freestone has twelve full years of general civil litigation experience. Mr. 
Freestone's practice has always been at least 90% civil litigation until the last four years when his 
practice emphasized more criminal litigation. Since then, his practice is 40% criminal and 60% civil 
litigation 
David Angerhofer has eleven full years of general civil litigation experience Mr 
Angerhofer's practice has always been 100% civil litigation, until the last four years, when he began 
to do more criminal litigation. Now his practice is approximately 40% criminal and 60% civil 
litigation. 
c) Habeas Corpus/Civil Rights Litigation Background 
Both Wayne Freestone and David Angerhofer have substantial experience in Habeas 
Corpus Writs and civil rights litigation Both Mr Angerhofer and Mr Freestone have been providing 
legal services for the inmates at the Utah State Prison at Draper, Gunnison, Iron County and the 
County jails for almost eight years During that period of time they have met with more than 10,000 
inmates and filed more than 444 Civil Rights Complaints and 162 Petitions For Writs of Habeas 
2 
Corpus Mr Angerhofer and Mr Freestone have also drafted approximately another 528 Civil Rights 
Complaints and 438 Petitions For Writs Of Habeas Corpus that have been sent to inmates who 
wished to file them themselves or have not returned the finalized documents for filing All of these 
Complaints and Petitions, of course, included all research and pleadings necessary to give the inmates 
access to the Courts 
SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Offerors have available for service of this contract, two full-time attorneys, the services of a 
legal secretary/paralegal and a separate receptionist who answers phones and takes phone messages 
in the absence of other personnel Offeror's legal assistant has an Associate of Applied Science 
Degree in Legal Assisting from Utah Valley State College, and has almost 8 years experience working 
with Offerors servicing the Utah Department of Corrections contracts Offerors have state-of the-art 
computers with Word Perfect 7 0 word processing programs Each computer has access to Lexis, 
a computerized legal data base Offerors have their own photocopy machines and access to the 
photocopy machine at the South Point facility at $0 032 per copy cost Offerors' offices also include 
a well-maintained legal library which is kept current 
Offerors' infrastructure is tried and tested This infrastructure has assisted the Offerors in 
more than adequately servicing an inmate population of approximately 4,000 for approximately eight 
years 
SERVICE SCHEME 
(a) Time Frames Of Service. Initial Contact 
Offerors will meet with the inmate within five (5) working days of the date that the 
inmate's request is posted by the correctional facility The only exception to this time period would 
be if the inmate were not accessible or if the inmate refused to meet with Offerors Offerors have 
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been informed that in a recent South Point audit by the Department of Corrections, it was found that 
Offerors only failed on one occasion to meet with inmates within a prescribed seven day period and 
that occasion was due to the inmate's refusal to meet with Oflferors In March, 1998, the Department 
of Corrections Inmate Placement Program prepared Contract Review Reports (See attached 
Contract Review Reports) All reports found Offerors to be in foil compliance NOTE' The IPP 
contract have varying posting schedules. Offerors anticipate a weekly posting of inmate requests for 
this contract As a general rule, Offerors have always met with the inmates either the day of or the 
day after the inmate list is posted (A copy of the Request For Appointment Form, that is used in the 
South Point, North Point and Gunnison Facilities to request legal services is attached hereto in the 
Appendix) 
During this initial interview the inmate or Offerors will fill out an "Inmate Intake Form" which 
will include all of the information necessary for future contacts (A copy of said form is attached 
hereto in the Appendix) 
(b) Time Frame of Services. Research and Pleadings 
In most cases Offerors will be able to conduct research and send follow up documents 
to the inmates within seven days of the initial interview Offerors will usually send to those inmates 
with meritorious claims a questionnaire to complete. (Copies of the questionnaires are attached 
hereto in the Appendix) The inmates are instructed to fill out these questionnaires so that we have 
in the inmates own words, all of the relevant facts This serves to protect both the legal services 
provider and the inmate Furthermore, these questionnaires assist the Offerors in screening out those 
claims which are non-meritorious In the event that the inmate is unable to fill out the questionnaire 
by himself, Offerors will meet with him to assist him When the pleadings are drafted from the 
questionnaires, Inmates will then be given the opportunity of reading through the initial pleading and 
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requesting any changes which are deemed to be in good faith and meritorious The inmate will also 
be notified that additional time for research will be needed 
In a few cases, where extensive research and/or investigation is required, additional 
time may be required In such cases, every effort will be made to perform the investigation in a timely 
fashion 
c) Communication With Inmates 
Inmates will be sent copies of all correspondence concerning their case In most cases 
a member of the Offeror's staff with knowledge of the inmates' case will be accessible by telephone 
during normal business hours In those instances where the inmate has a specific question or 
information about his case and no staff member is available, Offerors' receptionist will take a message 
and the inmate will be provided the information either during the Offeror's scheduled interview time 
at the facility or by mail 
(d) Reporting System 
Offeror has set up a system of forms which shall be used to maintain an efficient 
reporting system 
After having seen the inmate, the Offerors would return a copy of the Appointment Request 
Form with an indication of when they saw the inmate These would be kept on file by Corrections 
As mentioned above also, during the initial interview all of the inmate's pertinent information 
shall be obtained on a form Said form also requests, in the inmates own words, a brief description 
of the legal services he seeks This may be submitted to the supervising authority, as long as there 
is no conflict of interest involved with the supervising authority that is not waived by the inmate 
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Each file will contain a check list (see attachments hereto in the Appendix) which will 
document the completion and date of completion of each step of Offeror's provision of legal services. 
This form shall be available to the supervisory authority at any time. 
Offerors will keep time records of conferences and other services provided to the inmates (see 
attachment hereto in the Appendix) which will also be available to the supervisory authority upon 
their completion. 
Offerors also maintain notations on the Posting Lists which indicate which attorney met with 
the inmate and when. These are available to the supervisory authority. (See attachment hereto in the 
Appendix) 
Offerors would have available to corrections or the monitoring authority a quarterly report 
of the number of complaints and petitions filed and/or prepared, as well as a quarterly report of the 
number of inmates that have been seen by the Offerors. 
Offerors are willing and able to comply with and conform to the Standard Terms and 
Conditions (Attachment A and B) provided by the UDC. 
PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL PROPOSAL 
Offerors1 proposal is particularly beneficial because it has been well tested and has held up to 
the scrutiny of both Corrections and the inmates for almost eight years. Offerors' proposal also 
includes many extra benefits that are available to the inmates even though they are not included in 
Corrections' interpretation of Bounds v Smith. For example, Offerors have put together a packet 
which contains forms and rules for appealing an order of the Court denying the inmates' requested 
relief (See attachment hereto in the Appendix) This is not a requirement under Bounds v Smith, 
however, the Offerors believe the inmates are in desperate need of some assistance when their case 
is denied 
6 
Even though Offerors may decide that an inmate's claim has no merit, they will provide them 
with Do-It-Yourself Packets, complete with forms and instructions which will enable the inmate to 
still have access to the Courts, if they so choose (See attachment hereto in the Appendix) This is 
an important benefit to the inmates and also to Corrections, in that inmates cannot claim that they are 
being denied access to the Courts 
Another benefit that Offerors extend to the inmates is information regarding other services 
that they might avail themselves of and any other relevant addresses that they might need (See 
attachment hereto in the Appendix an Address Sheet handed out to the inmates) 
When inmates have questions regarding the Board of Pardons' policies and procedures, 
Offerors distribute copies of such to them (See attachment hereto in the Appendix) If the inmates 
want to obtain a transcript of their Board of Pardon Hearing, then we supply the inmate with an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity in order to receive it free of charge (See attachment hereto in the 
Appendix) 
Offerors always attempt to resolve problems which occur with conditions of confinement by 
first encouraging the inmate to file a grievance and then writing the individuals or departments 
involved This has resulted in many fewer lawsuits being filed 
Offerors also attempt to resolve issues with the Board of Pardons via letters and telephone 
correspondence prior to filing pleadings This too has avoided much litigation 
If inmates are having difficulty communicating with their legal counsel or other county and 
state agencies, Offerors will obtain and write letters on behalf of the inmates and forward responses 
OTHER BENEFITS 
The fact that Offerors are already servicing the North Point, South Point, Iron County, and 
County Jail facilities would be advantageous to the Central Utah Correctional Facility inmates It 
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is certain that many of the inmates that are now in the South Point, North Point, Iron County and 
County Jail facilities will be transferred back and forth between the Central Utah Correctional Facility 
and the other facilities. Since Offerors have consulted with more than 10,000 inmates in the last eight 
years, most of which have required follow up services, it is likely many of the inmates which will be 
transferred to the Central Utah Correctional Facility will still need follow up on these matters. 
If Offerors were servicing the Central Utah Correctional Facility in addition to the South 
Point, North Point, Iron County and County Jail facilities, then a transfer to the Central Utah 
Correctional Facility would not interfere with any legal services that the inmates have requested 
It is noteworthy that in the almost eight years that Offerors have been servicing these 
contracts, no grievances filed against Offerors, no bar complaints filed against Offerors and no 
lawsuits filed against Offerors have ever been deemed meritorious. Offerors believe that they provide 
the most efficient and professional service to the inmates that can possibly be provided by anyone. 
Dated this Tday of May, 1998 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE DAVID J. /ANGERHOFE 
50 West 300 South 50 West 300 South 
Suite 900 Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)328-5600 (801)328-5600 
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